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
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**Consulting Report**

**A SURVEY OF GENERAL AND UNIT STAFF TRAINING PROCEDURES  
AT DIVISION, BRIGADE, AND BATTALION LEVELS**

**by**

**Robert A. Baker and John G. Cook**

**March 1969**

This Consulting Report was prepared to describe the survey activities of Work Unit SIMULATE, "Development of New Simulation and Miniaturization Concepts to Meet Army Training Needs." It has been issued by the Director of Research of HumRRO Division No. 2 (Armor), Fort Knox, Kentucky. It has not been reviewed by nor does it necessarily represent the official opinion or policy of the Director, Human Resources Research Office, or the Department of the Army.

**HumRRO Division No. 2 (Armor)**

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## FOREWORD

Work Unit SIMULATE of the Human Resources Research Office proposes to develop improved techniques of combat simulation for several high-priority skills. The research reported here was undertaken in Work Sub-Unit II, "Exploratory Development of Simulation and Miniaturization Concepts," and describes current Army practices in the simulation of combat operations for the purpose of training general and special staff officers.

This survey describes an intermediate step--an analysis of current staff training practices--in the total research process. This information was needed in order to determine the kind and amount of training being given, the training methods being used, and the training problems that need to be solved. This information will be used in the development of improved simulational techniques and in increasing the combat realism of current training methods.

The research was conducted at HumRRO Division No. 2 (Armor), Fort Knox, Kentucky. It began under the supervision of Dr. Norman Willard, Jr., and was completed under Dr. Donald F. Haggard, the present Director of Research. Military support was provided by COL Charles H. Brown and LTC William Q. Harty, former Chiefs of the US Army Armor Human Research Unit, and is being continued by the present Unit Chief, LTC John A. Hutchins, Jr. Earlier publications resulting from Work Unit SIMULATE are two technical Reports, "Improving Army Training Through Simulation," (SIMULATE I), by Robert A. Baker and William L. Warnick, August 1968; and, "Determination of Combat Job Requirements for General and Unit Staff Personnel at Division, Brigade, and Battalion Levels," (SIMULATE II), by Robert A. Baker, February 1969.

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**A SURVEY OF GENERAL AND UNIT STAFF TRAINING PROCEDURES  
AT DIVISION, BRIGADE, AND BATTALION LEVELS**

## DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH

### Background

In December 1961, Headquarters, US Continental Army Command, concerned with the problem of constantly shrinking training areas and the increasing range requirements of new and more powerful weapons, undertook a formal study of battlefield simulation and the miniaturization of training. The first step of the study was an Army-wide survey of all Army commands concerned with training.<sup>2</sup> The survey, in the form of a detailed questionnaire about training facilities and limitations, uncovered a number of critical and Army-wide training problems that must be solved if the Army's combat-readiness mission is to be fulfilled. In general, the survey confirmed the fact that for most Army tactical units, combat training is severely limited or impossible because of insufficient room for the tactical employment and movement of troops and the lack of adequate range facilities for firing large caliber weapons, missiles, and aircraft. Although the variety of replies prohibits a full and detailed listing, the major problems can be categorized as follows:

1. Long-range weapons requiring extensive ground and air space (e.g., Honest John missile, 175mm gun, APDS ammunition).
2. Weapons, vehicles, and tactics which require extensive air space (e.g., armed helicopters, drones, aerial observer training).
3. Weapons, vehicles, and tactics which require extensive ground space (e.g., the Tank Crew Qualification Course; .50 caliber and 20mm automatic weapons; combined arms team employment; battalion, brigade,

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<sup>2</sup>Letter, Hq USCONARC, ATING-TNG 680, 15 December 1961, to all Commands, subject: "Miniaturization of the Battlefield" (Reports Control Symbol ATING-(OT)-383), and 27 Replies and Annexes I and II.



and division tactical maneuvers).

4. Special training such as CBR, logistics, engineering, and intelligence (e.g., Special Forces Operations, demolitions, bridging, and nuclear weapons training, which are limited by space, safety, and other necessary considerations).

In the summer of 1962, Headquarters Seventh US Army began a training area study that was instituted "because of the inadequacy of local and major training areas."<sup>3</sup> The problem was created by:

1. An expanding German economy that has increased pressure on US Forces to release lands and further restrict the use of local training areas.

2. The sharing of US-controlled major training areas by NATO forces and the limitation of battalion training time at any major training area to a maximum of six weeks per year.

3. An expanding Bundeswehr that entails increased requirements for time and space.

4. Mechanization of Seventh US Army and the introduction of new weapons.

Seventh Army is also confronted with the same training restrictions as the commands that replied to the CONARC survey. As long as there is a need for combat ready forces, weapons technology will probably continue to improve. With such improvement there will be a need for training and retraining in order to achieve and maintain the required degree of combat readiness. Thus both present and future training

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<sup>3</sup>Letter, Hq Seventh US Army, AETGC-TT, 2 October 1963, to CINC-USAREUR, subject: "Training Area Study." The study, independent of the CONARC survey, was completed in October 1963.

requirements indicate the need for either (a) a sizable increase in the total amount of land, both at home and abroad, set aside for combat training, or (b) the development of satisfactory substitutes for field training by means of special training devices or simulators, or by means of reducing the space requirements (e.g., reduced charge ammunition, terrain boards, and maximum use of available terrain); that is, battle-field miniaturization.

Recognition of the need and the alternatives is contained in the conclusions and recommendations sections of both the USCONARC survey and the Seventh Army training area study. In the USCONARC analysis, a dual research project was recommended, and it was suggested that HumRRO conduct the study of the overall training aspects of the problem, whereas USNTDC should conduct the training device and simulation aspects.<sup>4</sup> In both instances, the goal of this research was to be the production of specific solutions to the problems uncovered by the survey. In the conclusions section of the Seventh Army study, a requirement for the development and inclusion of additional miniaturization and training devices in the Army's training plans was made (para d) and in the recommendations section the following major requirements were stated:

1. "That each division, cavalry regiment, and the Combined Arms School be equipped with the miniature tank battlefield." (para b)
2. "That the field of plastic training ammunition be researched for possible acceptance into the Army training field and that HumRRO be encouraged to determine what training activities in USAREUR can be subjected to the same type of simulation as the Miniature Tank

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<sup>4</sup>See Note 2.

Battlefield." (para c)

3. "That at least four additional Trainfire Ranges be considered for construction to allow all personnel within the Seventh Army area to fire their annual arms qualification on this type range." (para d)

In response to these recommendations and to a specific request from Headquarters, US Army Europe, a HumRRO representative visited Seventh Army in February 1964 to study the training area problem. After the visit, Headquarters, Office of the Chief of Research and Development sponsored a one-year HumRRO exploratory study (FY 1965) for the purpose of (a) further defining the problem area, (b) conducting a survey of existing training device concepts and techniques of simulation and miniaturization, and (c) undertaking an analysis of the present Army system for development and implementation of such methods and techniques.<sup>5</sup> This work, now nearing completion, will pinpoint a number of high priority Army needs and suggest a number of specific devices and techniques which offer considerable promise as solutions to some of the critical training problems.

Some of these problems and suggested solutions are shown in Table 1. As shown in the table, no one research organization within the Army Study System is currently able to conduct research on all aspects of the problem and to provide firm cost-effectiveness ratios for all the possible solutions, devices, and procedures that might be proposed for future evaluation. Therefore, in keeping with HumRRO's mission and capability, some selection and reduction of the problem was indicated.

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<sup>5</sup> Human Resources Research Office. Work Program, Fiscal Year 1965 (Alexandria: HumRRO, 30 June 1964).

Table 1

**Types of Army Training That May Require Simulation and Miniaturization  
(Based on CONARC and Seventh Army Surveys)**

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**A. MAJOR UNIT TACTICAL EXERCISES THAT PRESENT A TRAINING DIFFICULTY:**

ROAD Division; Brigade; Armor Battalion; Mechanized Battalion;  
Tank Company;\* Mechanized Infantry Company;\* Armored Cavalry Regiment;  
Armored Cavalry Squadron; Armored Cavalry Troop;\* Armored  
Cavalry Platoon.\*

**SOLUTIONS MOST FREQUENTLY SUGGESTED BY ARMY COMMAND PERSONNEL:**

1. Continue to conduct large scale FTX's. Pay necessary costs.
2. Procure additional public lands, ranges, etc., for use on permanent, round-the-year basis.
3. Use only computerized war games, two-sided map exercises, etc.
4. Use reduced-scale FTX's. Make maximum use of available terrain.
5. Develop and administer realistic CP exercises for company level and up. Use field training at platoon level and below.
6. Train units in isolated areas in large-scale FTX's and rotate to USAREUR, FECOM, etc.
7. Use special simulators, aids, and devices for small units (squad, platoon, and company. Use cameras, miniature battlefield, combat decisions games, expanded for larger level operations.

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\*Skill analyses and identifications have been made for the Armored Cavalry Platoon, and partially made for the Tank Company, Mechanized Infantry Company, and Armored Cavalry Troop.

Table 1 Continued

B. WEAPONS FIRING THAT PRESENTS A TRAINING DIFFICULTY:

Tank Gunnery (M41, M48, M60);\* Tank Gunnery (Sheridan);\* Armed Helicopter Missile (M6); Antitank Guided Missile (ENTAC Shillelagh);\* Recoilless Rifle (M40A1 and M67); Mortar (M29 and M30); Artillery (M56SP)--105 Howitzer, 185 Howitzer, 8-Inch Howitzer; Missile Artillery--Pershing, Sergeant, Lance, Honest John, Little John, Hawk.

SOLUTIONS MOST FREQUENTLY SUGGESTED BY ARMY COMMAND PERSONNEL:

1. Use conventional classroom training and range or field firing.
2. Employ subcaliber substitution in range or field training or subcaliber substitution on miniature ranges.
3. Use plastic or reduced-charge ammunition.
4. Use special training aids, firing simulators, and devices, e.g. tank turret trainer, tank vs tank live fire device, cinetour, and Shillelagh devices.
5. Use simulated firing and dry firing exercises.
6. Isolate critical skills and train intensively on part or critical skill elements.

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\*Skill analyses and identifications have been made for the M41, M48, and M60 tank guns, and partially made for the Sheridan tank and the Antitank Guided Missile (ENTAC Shillelagh).

This reduction took the form of (a) completing a survey of existing training device concepts and simulation and miniaturization techniques, and (b) making an analysis of the present Army system for the development and implementation of such procedures.<sup>6</sup>

The results of this study indicated that significant improvement in the tactical proficiency of battalions, brigades, and divisions is highly correlated with the experience and training of general and unit staff officers. It was therefore decided to concentrate on methods of improving the training of general and unit staffs. Surveys, or systematic efforts to determine the manner in which these officers are being trained for combat assignment, and the means of improving such training, were in short supply. A survey of current training practices and procedures was therefore undertaken.

#### Objective of the Study

The overall objective of Work Unit SIMULATE was the improvement of combat simulation and training at higher levels of unit organization. The initial phase of the research for SIMULATE II was an attempt to determine present staff training practices and procedures and to identify critical training problems.

To obtain information on present and future needs with regard to staff training for combat, an Army-wide survey was made, covering (a) staff training practices and procedures in Army schools, (b) on-the-job staff training practices and procedures, (c) differences between staff

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<sup>6</sup>Baker, Robert A., and Warnick, William L. Improving Army Training Through Simulation, Draft Technical Report, HumRRD Division No. 2 (Armor) (Fort Knox, August 1968).

operations in garrison and in combat, and (d) present and future staff training problems.

The specific objectives of the survey were to (a) determine staff training problems at general and unit levels, (b) find ways of improving the quality and increasing the quantity of staff training, and (c) obtain additional information on staff proficiency which would be useful in improving combat simulation in future staff training exercises.

#### Method

General Approach. First, staff training literature used by the Command and General Staff College, the US Army Infantry School, and the US Army Armor School was studied to determine what types of questions would be most appropriate for use in the survey.

Discussions of the content of the survey were held with instructors in the Command and Staff Departments of the three schools. Also Command and General Staff College courses related to general staff operations and procedures were audited.

On the basis of the information obtained from the Army schools, a list of 33 questions was prepared for use in interviewing unit commanders and their staff members. The questions, some general and others specific, covered: the five general staff positions--G1 (personnel), G2 (intelligence), G3 (operations), G4 (logistics), and G5 (civil affairs); the chief of staff; the four unit staff positions--S1, S2, S3 and S4; and the unit executive officer. Content of the questions covered current training practices, procedures, and problems for each staff position; operational practices and procedures of the Divisional Tactical Operations Center (DTC), and of brigade and battalion Command Posts (CP's); previous,

current, and future Command Post Exercises (CPX's) and Field Training Exercises (FTX's), including successes, failures, and problems associated with such exercises; possible means of overcoming training area problems, including suggestions and ideas for improving training realism and combat simulation; and problems pertaining to the career pattern and training of commanders and staff personnel, and the differences between their garrison and combat duties.

The interviews were designed to elicit information about each job position and each training practice or problem, and to obtain new ideas and suggestions for improvement. Questions requiring a simple yes or no answer were supplemented by more specific questions, to uncover the reasoning on which the response was based. As the discussion developed during each interview, additional questions were asked as necessary, to clarify and develop the ideas and concepts.<sup>7</sup>

Population and Sampling. From April to August 1966, the survey was administered at the US Army Armor School, the US Army Infantry School, the US Army Command and General Staff College, and five TOE ROAD Divisions stationed in the United States. The divisional strength of the Army at the time of the study included 18 TOE ROAD Divisions of which two were Airborne Divisions, four were Armored Divisions, one was Air Assault, one was Air Mobile Cavalry, and the remaining ten were Infantry and Mechanized Infantry. To represent this population, the following organizations were visited:

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<sup>7</sup>Appendix A is the list of questions which served as the basis for the interviews.



<u>Division</u>	<u>Number of Major Elements</u>	<u>Location</u>
82d Airborne	3 Brigades 1 Armor Bn 9 Airborne Bns	Ft Bragg, N. C.
1st Armored	3 Brigades 4 Armor Bns 6 Inf (Mech) Bns	Ft Hood, Texas
2d Armored	3 Brigades 5 Armor Bns 4 Inf Bns	Ft Hood, Texas
4th Infantry	3 Brigades 2 Armor Bns 8 Rifle Bns 1 Mech Inf Bn	Ft Lewis, Washington
5th Mech Inf	3 Brigades 2 Armor Bns 8 Mech Inf Bns	Ft Carson, Colorado

Within each unit, the division, brigade, and battalion commanders or their designated representatives and a number of senior staff officers were selected for interview. Table 2 shows the number of officers interviewed for each staff position.

At the two service schools and the Command and General Staff College, the heads of the Command and Staff sections and departments and a number of senior instructors were interviewed.

Method of Analysis. When the interview program was completed, the replies to each question were tabulated to show the numbers and percentages of respondents who replied in various ways. It was considered advisable to reflect the qualifying remarks of the respondents in preparing the tabulations. In some instances, therefore, the statement of the question was elaborated beyond the one that served as the starting point.

In reporting the results, a quotation that reflected or typified the majority point of view was selected and is given verbatim. If in the opinion of the survey team there were minority points of view that a

Table 2

Number of Officers Interviewed (by Job Position)

<u>Job Position</u>	<u>Number Interviewed</u>
Division Commander (or Deputy)	5
Brigade Commander (or Deputy)	15
Battalion Commander	11
Chief of Staff	4
Executive Officer	3
Division G1	5
Division G2	5
Division G3	5
Division G4	4
Division G5	4
Brigade S1	3
Brigade S2	2
Brigade S3	2
Brigade S4	3
Battalion S1	2
Battalion S2	3
Battalion S3	2
Battalion S4	2
School Department or Section Head	5
Instructor	<u>7</u>
	92

number of officers agreed on--or if there were suggestions and recommendations of particular importance--these statements are also given.

Not all the officers answered every question. The percentage of the officers who supported a particular point of view, and that part of the officer population interviewed, are reported at the end of each quotation. To preserve anonymity, only duty status and type of Army unit in which the officer served are used to identify the source.

## SURVEY RESULTS

### I. Duties and Responsibilities of General and Unit Staff Officers

With regard to those questions on the duties and responsibilities of the general and unit staff officers, the majority of the officers interviewed responded in the following manner:

QUESTION A: Are there basic differences between the same staff job at the G level and the S level?

"No, there is basically no difference between the G-level staff jobs and the S-level staff, except that the G officer is more of a 'planner' and less of a 'doer' than the S level. At the G level you also have more assistants to call on than you have at the S level" (85% of total population, N = 78).

"I don't understand what you mean about discrepancies between C and GS and the Service Schools, unless you mean that they go into much more detail about the how and get down to the nitty-gritty at the Service Schools" (55% of total population, N = 51).

"Of course, the real problem at the Service School is the lack of time to teach all of these skills, for S1 through S5, at the level of detail demanded by the combat assignment at any of the jobs. It can't be done--we just give them a survey, a broad brush-over" (95% of School group, N = 11).

QUESTION B: Are staff duties approximately the same in garrison and in combat?

"Emphatically NO! In combat you have to take care of the house-keeping as well as the war. Combat requires entirely different skills and knowledges that are never used in garrison" (92% of total population,

N = 85).

QUESTION C: Since staff functions are common, and officers are commonly trained in all jobs, why are S3's, G2's, etc., hand-picked and carefully selected by the commanders?

"Although there are common staff functions such as supervising, etc., each job is unique and requires differing patterns of abilities and aptitudes. Whereas an S2 should be a good detective, a G5 should be a good PIO type, and a G3 a jack of all trades. You have to know your men when you pick them for these jobs. The more experience the man has on the job, or about the job, the better" (90% of total population, N = 83).

QUESTION D: Should staff officers receive general problem-solving training as well as detailed knowledges and skills training?

"The problem here is one of time. There isn't time in either the Advanced or Career Course in the branch Service Schools or at C&GS to teach any officer how to be a 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Yet we can't afford specialized training either because we can't predict where he'll go or what his job will be. So the training is primarily general" (95% of total population, N = 87).

"Training in generalized problem solving--on typical problems that continually crop up in combat or garrison--might be a worthwhile approach" (79% of total population, N = 73).

QUESTION E: What are the primary skill requirements or basic aptitudes and abilities for?<sup>8</sup>

1. A Commander:

- |                               |                             |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| a. General leadership ability | (90% of commanders, N = 28) |
| b. Flexibility                | (85% of commanders, N = 26) |
| c. Coordinator skills         | (72% of commanders, N = 22) |

<sup>8</sup>The skill requirements and abilities listed are those most frequently mentioned or cited by the interviewees.

- d. Intuition (65% of commanders, N = 20)
  - e. Organizing ability (62% of commanders, N = 19)
  - f. Guts (48% of commanders, N = 15)
  - g. Ability to use his staff (45% of commanders, N = 14)
  - h. Knowledge of men (40% of commanders, N = 12)
  - i. Knowledge of job (35% of commanders, N = 11)
2. A Chief of Staff:
- a. Ability to coordinate (97% of CO's and chiefs of staff, N = 34)
  - b. Knowledge of the commander (94% of CO's and chiefs of staff, N = 33)
  - c. Knowledge of staff duties and skills (88% of CO's and chiefs of staff, N = 31)
  - d. Planning ability (85% of CO's and chiefs of staff, N = 30)
  - e. Problem-solving ability (70% of CO's and chiefs of staff, N = 25)
3. A G1 (S1) Personnel Officer:
- a. Managerial ability (68% of commanders and staff officers, N = 54)
  - b. Arithmetic ability (55% of commanders and staff officers, N = 44)
  - c. Clerical ability (47% of commanders and staff officers, N = 38)
  - d. Ability to plan and organize (44% of commanders and staff officers, N = 35)
  - e. Knowledge of the organization (23% of commanders and staff officers, N = 18)
4. A G2 (S2) Intelligence Officer:
- a. Analytical ability (75% of commanders and staff officers, N = 60)
  - b. Intuition (70% of commanders and staff officers, N = 56)
  - c. Tactical skill (53% of commanders and staff officers, N = 42)
  - d. Attention to detail (42% of commanders and staff officers, N = 34)
  - e. Ability to talk and write clearly (33% of commanders and staff officers, N = 26)
5. A G3 (S3) Operations Officer:
- a. Ability to plan and organize (81% of commanders and staff officers, N = 65)
  - b. Clear thinking (67% of commanders and staff officers, N = 54)
  - c. Ability to get along with people (61% of commanders and staff officers, N = 49)
  - d. Tactical knowledge and skill (54% of commanders and staff officers, N = 43)
  - e. Knowledge of the organization (35% of commanders and staff officers, N = 28)
6. A G4 (S4) Logistics Officer:
- a. Organizational and administrative ability (82% of commanders and staff officers, N = 66)
  - b. Attention to detail (81% of commanders and staff officers, N = 65)

- c. Mathematical or numerical ability  
(63% of commanders and staff officers, N = 50)
- d. Ability to get along with people  
(51% of commanders and staff officers, N = 41)
- e. Ability to plan ahead  
(47% of commanders and staff officers, N = 38)

7. A G5 (S5) Civil Affairs Officer:

- a. Ability to get along with people - diplomatic ability  
(92% of commanders and staff officers, N = 74)
- b. Ability to coordinate  
(81% of commanders and staff officers, N = 65)
- c. Supervisory ability  
(64% of commanders and staff officers, N = 51)
- d. Planning ability  
(52% of commanders and staff officers, N = 42)

QUESTION F: Is there any one skill or ability of fundamental importance to a commander? A staff officer?

1. A Commander:

- a. Leadership  
(98% of commanders, N = 30)
- b. Tactical ability  
(90% of commanders, N = 28)
- c. Flexibility  
(81% of commanders, N = 25)
- d. Guts  
(49% of commanders, N = 15)
- e. Problem solving ability  
(41% of commanders, N = 13)
- f. Ability to use men  
(38% of commanders, N = 12)

2. A Staff Officer:

- a. Job knowledge  
(84% of commanders and staff officers, N = 67)
- b. Ability to handle small details  
(80% of commanders and staff officers, N = 64)
- c. Planning and organizing ability  
(71% of commanders and staff officers, N = 57)
- d. Ability to coordinate  
(66% of commanders and staff officers, N = 53)

QUESTION G: Are there fundamental personality or character differences between "Commanders" as a type, and "Staff Officers" as a type?

"No, not really. I can think of all types of commanders with radically different personalities. Take for example, Bradley and Patton. Alike? Not in any sense of the word. Our whole system, as you know, is based on the assumption that every good officer can serve as a staff officer and, if really good, can become a commander. That is, we know that the best tend to come out at the top of the heap" (86% of commanders

and staff officers, N = 69).

"Something that unfortunately we've never been able to do, but that I'd like to see tried, is to have our officers serve in every staff position before being given command. I think they'd make superb commanders this way. Not only would knowing the staff jobs enable them to tell when their own staff did a thorough job--but they also would be able to teach the staff how and what to do" (Deputy Infantry Division Commander's suggestion). 90% of the commanders and staff personnel (N = 72) who were queried about this felt that it would be desirable, but could not see how it could be accomplished. (See Question 4.)

QUESTION H: Should every officer be trained as both a commander and a staff officer, or should they specialize?

"I don't see that, under the present circumstances, we have any other alternative but to continue our present training philosophy, i.e., to train them for both staff and command jobs. Specialization is fine if we had a different world, and could be sure of getting what we need and assuming that we could solve the career and promotion problems, and a different sort of an Army. But things happen so swiftly in combat that flexibility of know-how is essential" (94% of commanders and staff officers, N = 75).

"I'd like to see every officer thoroughly trained in all the staff skills--but how is this possible?" (60% of total population, N = 55).

## II. On-the-Job Training Practices and Procedures for Staff Personnel

QUESTION A: What sort of on-the-job combat staff training is given in your organization?

"Other than the COMARC-required maneuvers, PTX's and CPX's, nothing.

We simply don't have the time or personnel for anything else with our current mission. Of course, we do have the older hands or the CO teach the new people the jobs, i.e., break them in" (92% of commanders and staff officers, N = 74).

"We have a regular map-exercise game that we play, and we fight back and forth across \_\_\_\_\_. Each officer plays his own staff role with our regular TOE and SOP and I give them problems periodically they have to solve.... We won a medal on the last Desert STRIKE Exercise, if you want to know how effective it is" (armor brigade commander).

QUESTION B: Who prepares your staff training exercises (CPX's, FTX's, etc.)? Who monitors or supervises them?

1. Who prepares?
  - a. We do, or division (75% of commanders and staff officers, N = 60)
  - b. Corps (60% of commanders and staff officers, N = 48)
  - c. Army (50% of commanders and staff officers, N = 40)
  - d. CONARC (40% of commanders and staff officers, N = 32)
  - e. STRIKE command (25% of commanders and staff officers, N = 20)
  - f. Former staff members (20% of commanders and staff officers, N = 16)
2. Who monitors?
  - a. Commander (80% of commanders and staff officers, N = 64)
  - b. Other units from our division (50% of commanders and staff officers, N = 40)
  - c. Corps (40% of commanders and staff officers, N = 32)
  - d. Army (30% of commanders and staff officers, N = 24)
  - e. STRIKE (25% of commanders and staff officers, N = 20)

QUESTION C: Are you satisfied with the training your staff has received so far? With your own training? How should it be improved?

"If I had competent, fully trained and experienced people--the people I should have--in my staff slots, then I would be satisfied. Right now we're using the people we have in these slots and they are young, inexperienced, and--for the most part--they are untrained" (85% of commanders, N = 26).

"For the trained people I have, yes, I'm satisfied with their training"



(60% of the commanders, N = 19).

"Yes, I am satisfied with my own training, but I learned a great deal myself on the job and through experience" (78% of the commanders, N = 23).

"Realism in staff exercises and CPX's needs to be improved" (80% of commanders and staff officers, N = 64).

"CPX's in general need to be improved" (94% of the population, N = 87).

"We need to go into the field more--out on the ground for personal recon so we can learn how to occupy and use terrain" (40% of commanders and staff officers, N = 32).

"We need more, in fact constant, OJT and realistic CPX's to keep up our skills and to keep us from getting rusty" (85% of commanders and staff officers, N = 68).

"Support personnel must also practice their skills in the field--or some way--under simulated combat conditions" (45% of commanders and staff officers, N = 36).

"We need more training in the use of our communications--especially in the use of the intelligence net" (30% of commanders and staff officers, N = 24).

"At present the net is overburdened and we need guidance and direction on the use of the intelligence net and how to handle the enormous amount of information we get" (25% of commanders and staff officers, N = 20).

QUESTION D: Do you have enough time for OJT? If No, what is the best solution?

"No, we don't have time enough for OJT" (94% of commanders and staff

officers, N = 77).

"The only solution is to schedule time for it--give it command emphasis and de-emphasize something else" (90% of commanders and staff officers, N = 72).

"The only other solution is to squeeze it in somehow" (95% of commanders and staff officers, N = 76).

QUESTION E: How do you supervise or break in inexperienced officers?

"In general, it's mostly sink or swim. We give them guidelines in the form of Memos, SOP's, and personal advice and so do the Chief of Staff and the other officers. We encourage them to bring the difficult ones to us first--before they goof" (78% of commanders, N = 24).

QUESTION F: How can OJT Staff Training be improved?

1. Improve realism of training exercises:  
(80% of commanders and staff officers, N = 64)
2. Schedule time for staff training on weekly basis:  
(75% of commanders and staff officers, N = 60)
3. Increase amount of routine daily work in CPX's--also occurs in combat:  
(68% of commanders and staff officers, N = 54)
4. Increase command emphasis on staff training:  
(52% of commanders and staff officers, N = 42)
5. Include Heliborne and Airborne operations and concepts:  
(44% of commanders and staff officers, N = 35)
6. Emphasize staff coordination:  
(38% of commanders and staff officers, N = 30)
7. Include work in coordination with the Air Force, Navy, and Marines:  
(25% of commanders and staff officers, N = 20)
8. Cross-train between Army branches:  
(20% of commanders and staff officers, N = 16)
9. Change the CPX terrain and locale frequently:  
(10% of commanders and staff officers, N = 8)

QUESTION G: Would a DIOC or a CT Trainer or computerized war game be of value?

"Depends on what it is--and how difficult to set up, man, and use. Can't be too complex on the gadget side or it won't be maintained, and if not maintained it won't be used" (85% of commanders and staff officers, N = 68).

QUESTION H: Are you or your officers taking correspondence courses from C&GS?

YES (62% of commanders and staff officers, N = 50)

NO (38% of commanders and staff officers, N = 30)

QUESTION I: What is the best way to prepare or train a staff for combat?

"Combat experience at a junior staff or command level is best for higher staff and command duty" (98% of commanders and staff officers, N = 78).

"Next best is personal guidance from a combat experienced senior officer" (80% of commanders and staff officers, N = 64).

"Finally, realistic, well-written, and carefully planned and staged CPX's" (70% of commanders and staff officers, N = 56).

QUESTION J: Are any of your garrison activities of training value for your combat job? For the staff?

"Yes, some of the logistical problems, training problems, etc., but too few are of direct relevance. In other words, combat and garrison are radically different and tactical planning is, of course, not done in garrison--except in training" (90% of commanders, N = 28).

Same for the staff functions (88% of commanders, N = 27).

### III. Combat Readiness Training--Command Post and Field Training Exercises

QUESTION A: What sort of staff combat training is provided? Are you satisfied with it? How can it be improved? What prevents improvement?

"Other than our quarterly, semi-annual, and annual FTX's and CPX's, none. Of course, the staff is busy on all of these" (89% of the commanders, N = 28).

"No, I am not satisfied with it. I feel we need more" (85% of the

commanders, N = 26).

"The main problem with our CPX's is their lack of realism and our lack of time for properly preparing and staging them" (78% of the commanders, N = 24).

"We simply don't have the time to prepare for combat and complete our primary mission at the same time" (92% of the commanders and staff officers, N = 74).

QUESTION B: How many CPX's do you have annually? How conducted? Are they effective training media?

1. Five or more (10% of commanders, N = 3)
2. Two to four (37% of commanders, N = 12)
3. None to two, or what is required by higher Hq (53% of commanders, N = 16)

"We write them ourselves or use what is handed down, and spend two or three days getting ready and then two or three days in the field running it. We usually take only a limited number of support personnel since they're needed to run things--the post, etc.--while we're training. As you can imagine, they're not very effective. But this is not to say they couldn't be if we spent time in preparation and execution with all our personnel and gave them the proper command emphasis" (77% of commanders, N = 24).

QUESTION C: Are FTX's of any combat training value to the staff? How? If no, why not?

"Yes, they're of some value to the staff. We do have to prepare logistical plans, operations orders, estimate POL requirements, road clearances, coordination, etc. So I would say they are of some training value. They are, of course, of more value to the troops and small unit

leaders for whom they're intended. If you're really asking do I consider these as primary training vehicles for my staff, then I'd have to answer no,--not by a long shot, since there are thousands of things the staff must do that FTX's don't begin to touch" (85% of the commanders and staff officers, N = 68).

QUESTION D: It has been suggested that combat readiness can be gained by strengthening training at small unit level, improving CPX's in realism and content and then putting two trained products together--reducing need for large-scale maneuvers. What do you think?

"Certainly, I think this is what we have to do. Large scale FTX's are necessary once in a while to test your commo, coordination, and mobility, but for real combat readiness we need intensive workout on the ground in realistic conditions. Now, this doesn't mean you have to have all your combat elements out there, too--but you do need your full complement of staff and staff support people. If we wrote really good CPX's and carried them out under realistic field conditions, we could really do the job; assuming, of course, your line elements are doing what they have to do, too" (67% of commanders and staff officers, N = 54).

"Well, it might, but I don't think we'll ever be able to get away from at least two to three big exercises a year to be really combat ready" (23% of commanders and staff officers, N = 18).

"This is what we do now--except I wouldn't want to swear about how good our CPX's are and about the marrying end of it" (10% of commanders and staff officers, N = 8).

"Concentration on excellence at the small unit level is essential. We learned this well from Viet Nam. The most serious error we make that I can think of is that we seem to practice our combat errors and mistakes

in our peacetime CPX's. This must stop" (staff officer, mechanized division).

"Even after as short a period as three months without a CPX, the staff gets rusty. These combat skills are, for my money, highly perishable" (mechanized division commander).

"There is no realism in the conduct of G4 activities on the typical CPX. Nothing is being moved. No supplies are needed, etc., and, worst of all, the statistics or figures are hypothetical and unrealistic or they are based on World War II concepts" (staff officer, infantry division).

#### IV. Training and Career Patterns for Field Grade Officers

QUESTION A: Are you satisfied with present career training programs for commanders and staff officers? If no, how can it be improved?

"No, I'm not satisfied. I think we have got to do better, especially in view of the way the world is changing and the way warfare is changing" (84% of the commanders and staff officers, N = 67).

"Yes, pretty much so. I think our present orientation based on the Haines Board concept is already out of date, however, and that we ought to go back to some of our earlier ideas" (25% of school group, N = 3).

"No, I think the Haines Board concepts really brought us forward, educationally, into the Twentieth Century. But we need to look ahead and change the entire career patterns to reflect the need for more education, technical know-how, and politics so we can handle ourselves in the political infighting and the political arena" (15% of the school group, N = 2).

"Yes, I think that the present career training pattern on an overall

basis is much better than it used to be, but further improvements are needed and they can be made" (60% of school group, N = 7).

"Specialization and a career in one field of specialized endeavor like an Army surgeon might be the answer to the training problem, but I'm afraid it might create more problems than it would solve" (52% of the total population, N = 48).

"If something could be worked out with career patterns for advancement in narrower fields of specialization, i.e., more specialized career fields be created, then maybe it would solve a lot of manpower supply and personnel problems" (33% of the total population, N = 30).

QUESTION B: 'The best commander is the man who has served in all staff positions at some time in his career.' Do you agree with this?

"Is there any such a man? Of course, no one lives so long that he has the opportunity to be a 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 before getting command. Well--anyway, he's a rare bird if he did. But yes, I can see the merit in what you're proposing. Such a man would be superbly trained, and if he's the right sort of man to boot, he'd make a superb leader" (93% of total population, N = 86).

"I think you're talking about an impossible idealistic training situation" (41% of the total population, N = 38).

QUESTION C: With common ROAD Division structure, staff interchangeability among the service branches is feasible and should be encouraged. Do you agree?

"Yes, I agree" (87% of total population, N = 80).

"We do this anyway now" (13% of total population, N = 12).

"Unfortunately, there is no ROAD organization, per se. It differs structurally from unit to unit and mission to mission" (staff officer,

infantry division).

"If you were to assemble a G staff now from four or five different divisions--where they are currently acting in Assistant G staff roles--they would behave like they came from five different foreign armies. I agree most heartily" (infantry division commander).

"I'm not so sure the flexibility of the ROAD concept is really good--who commands the battalion, the Battalion CO or the Brigade CO? Under the ROAD concept there is too much confusion over whether division contacts the battalion directly or works through the brigade" (airborne division commander).

"ROAD concept is not followed in Viet Nam. The TOE is or was designed for combat and it isn't adequate for garrison in foreign areas. The ROAD concept makes the brigade a tactical headquarters, not an administrative one, and this just doesn't work since in Viet Nam the brigade does everything. True, we're not allowing the ROAD concept to work, but the point is--it doesn't work even if we did" (staff officer, armored division).

"The brigade position in garrison is a most difficult position--either tactically or administratively--sometimes the division goes directly to battalion and sometimes they don't. We never know when or why" (infantry brigade commander).

QUESTION D: Is it a serious mistake to prepare staff officers for World War III using World War II concepts?

"Perhaps, but what else do we have but experience to go on? In fact, 'lessons learned'--supposedly from Viet Nam--are old hat to experienced World War II combat troops, even to those not in the Pacific



Theater. What worries me more is the fact that the schools always teach that optimum conditions prevail; i.e., that you have a full TOE, maximum support, an equal number of opposing forces and aggressors, etc. Moreover, I fear we tend to operate nowadays on too grand a scale--we seem to think we'll have computers and robots down at platoon level--this is wrong. Maybe in 1990, but not now" (81% of commanders and staff personnel, N = 65).

"I'm more concerned about the lack of realism in our training. For real training effectiveness for our staff officers, we ought to let some of our amateur graduates prepare the operations orders, and then have the command try to operate with what he's done. Not only would this provide excellent training, but it would be maximally realistic for everyone" (staff officer, mechanized division).

QUESTION E: Would cross training among staff jobs be of value?

"Certainly it would. This, of course, is the approach taken by the C&GS school and by the branch service schools. Every student is taught all five jobs. Well--maybe 'taught' is incorrect and 'familiarized' would be better. Anyway, they are told about all five jobs and how the S2-S3 or G2-G3 Sections and the S1-S4 or G1-G4 Sections operate. If you're asking about cross training at the OJT level, then yes, I think there should be a lot of it--but there should be more OJT in the primary jobs too--we don't even have time to do enough of this" (63% of the commanders and staff officers, N = 50).

"Unfortunately at the brigade and battalion levels the people (staff) don't even get the formal training they need, and too few of the young staff officers we get have had the field experience. If they are adequately experienced in the field--independently of having done staff

work--the transition to staff is easy; otherwise, it's difficult for the man to make the adjustment" (senior staff officer, airborne division).

"Well, personnel shortages and personnel turnover have a lot to do with the training problem. Right now captains and lieutenants are filling our brigade staff slots and majors are a rarity. I cannot request and get a man that is school trained at this level. Deployment priorities determine whether you get the trained or not. And trained means just that, general not specific. What they learn they learn from me and the other seniors. As for cross-training, they get a lot, naturally, since we shift them around as a result of turnover, putting the most experienced in the 3 and 4 slots" (commander, mechanized division).

#### V. General and Local Staff Training Problems

QUESTION A: Are staff officers well trained when they start their job? Do you assume they'll learn on the job? Were your present staff officers trained at Leavenworth?

"Some are and some aren't well trained at the outset. If I can handpick who I want, they're well trained. Of course, if you have a good 3 and a good 4, this helps tremendously. I figure they can learn a lot on the job--they have to, in fact, in order to work with a particular commander and his style as well as the outfit itself--each unit has its own peculiarities. As for my present staff, about half of them were at C&GS--the other half is much too young" (64% of commanders and chiefs of staff, N = 22).

"Trained or untrained, the new staff officer has a lot to learn on the job and he needs to be adaptable and flexible. Personnel turnover is a...problem. Policy files should be a law--unfortunately, they are

not a universal phenomena" (senior staff officer, mechanized division).

QUESTION B: How can branch service schools improve their staff training programs?

"This is really a rough problem, but I think the branch schools try to do too much" (75% of commanders and staff officers, N = 60).

"They try to teach the young officer how to be all things to all men at once, and all he winds up with is a smattering of ignorance--much as I hate to say it" (51% of commanders and staff officers, N = 41).

"They model their instruction pretty much on what C&GS teaches, and they try to make them all generals" (42% of commanders and staff officers, N = 34).

"I think they teach too much at too high a level" (38% of commanders and staff officers, N = 30).

"Maybe well worked-out training exercises at the battalion and brigade levels similar to Leavenworth's JAYHAWK and SESAME might be the best way to teach the S-level jobs. Especially if every student rotated through all the jobs--worked common problems in each job, etc." (suggestion by one commander and two staff officers).

"In my opinion, and remembering some of the training exercises that we ran, I think that many of their so-called CPX's are better suited for the strategic rather than the tactical level" (chief of staff, mechanized division).

"Two things are wrong at the school. First, no one dares teach doctrine at the school level any more--they're afraid that it would infringe on the prerogative of the commander, and second, they then turn right around and preach and teach the philosophy that anyone can be a

great leader. So what do we get? Ignorance and arrogance, that's what!"  
(commander, infantry division).

QUESTION C: It has been argued that most current CPX's test and train only the S2-S3 and G2-G3 sections. Is this true? If true, what should be done about it?

"Yes, unfortunately, this is essentially correct" (83% of commanders and staff officers, N = 66).

"We have slighted the other staff functions in favor of the 2 and 3 section. There is little time or opportunity to consider division G4 or G5 duties, or to involve all of the necessary support people" (47% of commanders and staff officers, N = 38).

"We also need to learn to operate with less than a full staff of support people, which is seldom done. At the outset you lose 10% of your people for details--Red Cross, PX, etc.--and another 10% to AMOL and sick call; so you're down 20% to start with" (21% of commanders and staff officers, N = 17).

"There's a definite need for somebody to portray the G4 business during wartime, and to furnish guidance for and emphasis on the attainment of combat readiness" (commander, mechanized division).

"The G1 and G4 are neglected in the scenarios of most CPX's. Once again, you get rusty unless you practice these skills periodically" (airborne division commander).

QUESTION D: Not all staff officers attend C&GS College. How is the best way to train these officers?

"The obvious answer is either on the job or by correspondence courses from C&GS. Now, if we had the time and if we had the training mission and if we had good CPX's or staff training problems, then we of

course could do it here in the unit--but let's put first things first; we have a mission, and it must come first. We need the officer already trained--not here for us to train" (87% of commanders and chiefs of staff, N = 31).

QUESTION 2: It has been suggested that a continuing QJT map exercise or war game package designed to train the staff in all aspects of combat operations and used daily as a sort of second hobby and to fill in slack periods would be a "painless" and optimal way to keep a staff trained and combat ready. What do you think of this idea?

"Now that I understand what you have in mind--I think it is an excellent idea" (94% of total population, N = 87).

"When and where can we get such a package? Such a thing would work only if we got the package already worked out in great detail--and if the idea received strong command emphasis" (4% of total population, N = 3).

"Since we're a STRIKE outfit, we do something pretty much like this already. We have to in order to stay ready" (airborne staff officer).

"We do this here in this brigade and we've been doing it for the past two years. We have a regular map exercise game that we play, and we fight back and forth across \_\_\_\_\_. Each officer plays his own staff role with our regular TOE and SOP, and I give them problems periodically they have to solve. We won a medal on the last DESERT STRIKE exercise, if you want to know how effective it is" (armor brigade commander). (This paragraph has been quoted exactly in a previous section, p. 18.)

QUESTION 7: Can you think of any major or minor staff training problems or staff problems of any sort that are in need of solution and/or additional research?

1. "Our present TOE makes it absolutely impossible to man and staff

the two command posts called for in the ROAD division organization. We have neither the personnel nor the communications for this capability." (87% of the commanders and staff officers, N = 70, made this or a similar observation.)

2. "Every brigade SOP within the division should be identical—unfortunately they are not. In this organization, unfortunately, the brigades are really operating as regiments. In theory, the ROAD building block concept might work, in practice it doesn't" (staff officer, mechanized infantry division).

3. "People think paperwork decreases once you leave Stateside—some, yes, but there is an increase in other activities sufficiently large to account for a threefold increase in paperwork during combat" (commander, airborne division).

## APPENDIX A: LIST OF QUESTIONS ON WHICH THE INTERVIEWS WERE BASED

### 1. Duties and Responsibilities of General and Unit Staff Officers

a. We have heard there are no differences between the job of a G1 and an S1, the job of a G2 and an S2, etc., except in terms of degree or amount of detail. Yet there appear to be discrepancies between what is taught at the Command and General Staff College (general staff level) and what is taught at the branch service schools (unit staff level). Could you clarify this for us?

b. Are the duties and responsibilities of a staff officer approximately the same in combat and in garrison?

c. Since so much of the staff officer's job is the same, i.e., providing information, making estimates, making recommendations, preparing plans and orders, supervising, etc., it would seem it doesn't matter which job--1, 2, 3 or 4--a trained officer is assigned to. Yet we hear that different staff jobs require different aptitudes, traits, and abilities. Moreover, the commander, we understand, is quite particular in selecting certain men for certain staff positions. Just what is the case here?

d. From our study of the training literature and our initial conversation with staff officers at Fort Knox, we have the impression that not only must the staff officer know his individual job but he must also be able to be creative within the existing sets of limitations. Is this true? Should every staff officer be a problem-solver, and trained this way?

e. What do you consider to be the primary skill requirements or basic aptitudes and abilities for a division (brigade) (battalion)

commander? Chief of staff? G1 (S1)? G2 (S2)? G3 (S3)? G4 (S4)? G5?

f. Can you think of any one skill or ability that is of fundamental importance to a commander? A staff officer?

g. A few years ago our research unit was asked to look into the problem of basic personality and aptitude differences between "commanders" and "staff officers." A number of people had argued that good commanders are born, and that good staff officers are fundamentally--i.e., constitutionally--different from the "commander" type. What is your opinion?

h. How do you feel about the present training philosophy that assumes every officer will become both a commander and a staff officer, and trains him accordingly?

2. On-the-Job Training Practices and Procedures for Staff Personnel

a. What sort of on-the-job training for the staff is given in your organization?

b. Who prepares your staff training exercises (CPX's) (ATT's) (FTX's)? Who monitors (supervises) (scores) this training?

c. Are you satisfied with the training your staff has received so far? Your own training? In what way or ways does it need to be improved?

d. Do you feel you have enough time for OJT? If no, what do you think is the best solution to this dilemma?

e. For inexperienced officers newly assigned to the staff jobs, how do you go about supervising their work, i.e., "breaking them in"?

f. Can you think of any ways and means by which on-the-job training can be improved?

g. Would, in your opinion, a DIOC (CP) trainer, a computerized war



game, or some such training device be of any value to your unit?

h. Are you or any of your officers taking any correspondence courses from C&GS?

i. In your own opinion, what is the best way to prepare or train a staff for combat?

j. Are any of the garrison activities you now undertake of any training value to your combat job? How about members of your staff, the 1, 2, 3, or 4?

3. Combat Readiness Training--Command Post and Field Training Exercises

a. What sorts and kinds of combat training do you provide for members of your staff? Are you satisfied with this training? If no, what is wrong with it? How can it be improved? What obstacles prevent your bringing about this improvement?

b. How many CPX's do you have annually? How are they carried out? Do you feel they are effective? If no, why not?

c. Are FTX's of any combat training value to members of your staff? If yes, how? If no, why not?

d. In view of the expense and severe restrictions on maneuver space for combat units of battalion, brigade, and division size, it has been suggested that combat readiness could still be achieved by (1) concentrating on improved training at the squad, platoon, and company level; (2) improving the realism of CPX's and increasing their number; and then (3) putting the two trained products from (1) and (2) together. What is your opinion of this suggestion?

4. Training and Career Patterns for Field Grade Officers

a. Are you entirely satisfied with the present career training

pattern for the commander and the staff officer? If no, how do you feel it could be improved?

b. The statement has been made to the effect that "The best commander would be a man who has served in all of the staff positions first." Here the argument is, all other things being equal--i.e., temperament, etc.--that such a man would better know and understand the staff work and could (1) use his staff more efficiently and (2) train them better since he knows the jobs. What do you think of this?

c. With the common ROAD divisional structure for armor, infantry, artillery, etc., some officers have intimated that interchangeability at the staff level among the branches of service, etc., is not only feasible but should be encouraged for broadening and training purposes. What do you think of this proposal?

d. Many experienced officers have expressed the thought that every war is different, and preparing the staff officer for World War III using World War II concepts and procedures is a serious mistake. Do you agree or disagree?

e. Do you feel that cross-training among the staff-level jobs would be of value? That is, teach each man to understand the other man's job, since so much cross-support and coordination is needed in staff work. How do you feel about this?

##### 5. General and Local Staff Training Problems

a. Do you feel that your staff officers are well trained when they start their job? Do you assume that they'll learn the job on the job? Have all your present staff officers been trained at Fort Leavenworth?

b. How, in your opinion, can the branch service schools improve

their staff training programs? Since they are supposed by mission to prepare the young officer for command in combat--for special staff work as well as for S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5 duties--how do you think they can best accomplish these multiple missions in the time allotted to the Career Course at the school?

c. It has been argued that current staff training in CPX's attempts to simulate combat conditions and is primarily a workout for the G2-G3 and S2-S3 Sections, with little or no involvement for the 1, 4, or 5 elements, and especially little exercise for the numerous other assistant staff members, etc. How do you feel about this? Is it true? If so, what can be done about it?

d. Not all career officers are able to attend C&GS before being assigned to staff jobs. How, in your opinion, is the best way to train such officers?

e. It has been suggested that a continuing war game--involving all of the staff members in their assigned combat roles and played by the staff incumbents as a sort of hobby--could be superimposed on the daily unit schedule with little or no harm. By the use of current SOP's, TOE's, contingency and emergency plans, local maps, aerial photos, etc., such training exercises--carried out on a day-to-day, week-by-week basis and intensified whenever slack periods in day-by-day garrison operations permit--would and could be an effective and easy-to-accomplish training procedure for the noncombat TOE unit staff officers. What do you think of this proposal? If such exercises--staff training exercises--were prepared and packaged (with recommended staff actions and procedures), would you be able and willing to use them for on-the-job staff training?

f. Can you think of any major (or minor) staff training problems in need of solutions and/or additional research?